Abstract-Secure network coding assumes that the underlying network channels are error-free; thus, if our channels introduce errors, we need to first apply a channel code to correct them, and then build security on top of the resulting error-free network. In this paper, we develop achievability protocols and outer bounds for the secure network coding setting, where the edges are subject to packet erasures, and public feedback of the channel state is available to both Eve and the legitimate network nodes. We show that by leveraging erasures and feedback, we can achieve secrecy rates that are in some cases multiple times higher than the alternative of separate channel-error-correction followed by secure network coding; moreover, we develop outer bounds and prove optimality of our proposed schemes in some special cases.
receivers over a packet network with unit-capacity edges, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve; the min-cut to each receiver equals h and Eve wiretaps any z ≤ h edges of the network. By exploiting the fact that there will exist at least h − z paths towards each receiver that Eve will not overhear, it is possible to securely communicate at rate h − z, provided that intermediate nodes are able to perform coding operations on their incoming information packets. This seminal work was followed by significant work in the literature, that provided alternative and more efficient code designs [6] [7] [8] , considered edges with unequal capacity, adversaries that can wiretap only specific sets of z edges in the network [9] , or adversaries that wiretap nodes as opposed to edges [10] [11] [12] . In this paper, we provide achievability schemes and outer bounds for the secure network coding setting, where the edges are subject to packet erasures, and public feedback of the channel state is available to both Eve and the legitimate network nodes.
A key assumption in secure network coding is that the communication channel underlying each edge is error-free; thus if a wiretapper, Eve, observes an edge, she gets access to all the information that flows through it. Since most practical channels introduce errors, underlying the error-free assumption is an implicit "channel coding" followed by "security coding" separation: if our channels introduce errors, we first need to apply a channel code to correct them, and then build security on top of the resulting error-free networks. But as a result, we cannot achieve any positive rate securely through the edges that Eve observes.
This approach is clearly suboptimal. To illustrate, consider a very simple scenario: two communicating principals, Alice and Bob connected through a point-to-point erasure channel, and an adversary Eve, who is eavesdropping on their channel; assume Alice and Bob want to exchange a message (without using an out-of-band channel) that remains secure from Eve. When Alice transmits, she may be overheard by both Bob and Eve, however, due to the channel variability, it is unlikely that Bob and Eve will overhear exactly the same signal. In erasure networks, this is captured by independent erasures across the receivers. It has been long known in the information theory community that, if Bob and Eve do not overhear exactly the same information from Alice's transmission, it is theoretically possible for Alice to send a secret message to Bob that Eve learns nothing about [13] , even when the adversary has a better channel, provided a feedback channel is available [14] . This paper considers the secure network coding setup over networks with erasures and feedback; our goal is to 0018-9448 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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understand what are the potential benefits that exploiting erasures and feedback can offer. Accordingly, instead of the unit-capacity error-free edges that secure network coding assumes, we consider the simplest generalization, independent erasure networks with the same erasure probability δ in each channel. We assume that there exist h edge-disjoint paths from the source to each receiver, and that our eavesdropper, Eve, observes any z channels in the network. When eavesdropping transmissions on a channel that connects node u to node v, Eve also receives the packet transmissions of node u with erasure probability δ E , independently of node v. Moreover, we assume that Eve, and if they wish all legitimate nodes in the network, causally learn whether or not v has successfully received the packets that u transmits; that is, we assume that causal channel state feedback is available. Erasure networks, although simpler than general networks, still capture the intricacies and possibilities of operating in a lossy network environment; in particular, when coupled with channel state feedback, they enable to explore the utility of feedback for secrecy over networks. We design new achievability schemes, that leverage erasures and feedback, to achieve secrecy rates that are in some cases multiple times higher than the alternative of separate channelerror-correction followed by secure network coding. Our schemes require only point-to-point feedback, that is, for each edge (u, v) , only the transmitter u needs to learn which packets v received. We build our schemes in stages. We first provide a modified construction for the original secure network coding scheme, that achieves the optimal rate h − z. The original construction in [4] simultaneously sends keys and messages encrypted with the keys to the receivers; the receivers solve linear equations to retrieve both the keys and the messages at the same time. Our modified construction utilizes two phases: in the first key-sharing phase, the source establishes secret keys with the receivers; in the second message sending phase, it uses these established secret keys to encode and securely send messages. Although there is no difference in achievable rates between the original and our modified approach, by explicitly separating the two phases enables to optimize each phase on its own, significantly simplifying the design over networks with errors, and offering a better understanding of the benefits we get. Moreover, it enables to more easily adapt different network code designs for secure network coding over errorfree networks to erasure networks; we illustrate how to do so for the original designs in [4] , as well as for the only deterministic polynomial time designs we known of, in [15] . Accordingly, our protocols exploit erasures and feedback to achieve benefits during both the key-sharing and messagesending phases. During the key-sharing phase, our protocol aims to achieve two goals: create as much shared randomness between the source and the receivers as possible, while minimizing the amount of randomness that Eve collects. During the message-sending phase, we encrypt our messages using a one-time pad approach, and employ for the encryption an amount of key equal to the amount of packets that Eve will receive over the erasure channels she observes. Thus, compared to error-free networks, we gain benefits in two ways:
(1) we can create keys at higher rates during the first phase, and (2) we need to create a smaller amount of keys to protect the message-sending during the second phase, since Eve observes less relevant information over erasure networks.
Apart from achievability schemes, we also provide two outer bounds. Both outer bounds assume that all legitimate nodes, as well as Eve, receive channel state feedback from all channels in the network; moreover, they assume that we know the location of Eve, which can only increase the achievable rates. The first outer bound considers secure information flow through a cut-set in the network and can be applied for any network topology. The second bound holds when the network is such that the source and destination nodes have exactly h outgoing and incoming edges respectively; in this case we obtain a bound that takes into account the fact that we have multihop paths and -in many cases -is tighter than the bound based on cut-set arguments. We show that in some configurations the bounds match the rate of our achievability schemes and thus we have optimality; and we prove that in the worst case, the gap between the outer bounds and our achievability scheme is 1 1−δ . We conclude the paper by discussing a number of small examples, that go beyond the modeling assumptions of our work, and may open interesting directions for future research. For instance, we observe that over networks with erasures and feedback, we can achieve nonzero secrecy rates even when z > h, i.e., when Eve observes more than h edges in the network; we can exploit edges that are not useful for message transmissions to create randomness that can help more efficiently create keys between network nodes; and we can use intermediate node randomness, if available, to create point-to-point keys that can offer nonzero communication rates even when Eve observes all the edges in the network.
In summary, our main contributions are:
• We prove that secure network coding can be cast as a two-phase scheme, consisting of a key generation phase followed by a message sending phase, with no loss of optimality.
• We design achievability schemes that, by leveraging erasures and feedback, can offer up to multiple times higher secure message sending rate as compared to the alternative of channel coding followed by secure network coding for an error-free network. Our schemes can adapt secure network coding code constructions to erasure networks with feedback, as we illustrate for the currently most efficient schemes in [15] .
• We derive two new outer bounds that in some cases match the rate of our achievability schemes, and prove a worst case gap of 1 1−δ . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our network model and notation; Section III summarizes background and presents simple alternative schemes; Section IV provides an overview of our main results; Sections V-VI describe our achievability coding schemes; Section VII outlines our outer bounds; and Section VIII discusses possible extensions. We delegate some technical points and proofs to the appendices.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We assume that communication takes place over a network which is represented as a directed acyclic multigraph G(V, E) (i.e., a graph with potentially parallel edges), where V is the set of network nodes and E is the set of edges. The goal of the communication is for a source node s ∈ V to securely send a message W to a set of destination nodes D ⊂ V , in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. Eve can arbitrarily select up to z edges of the network to wiretap. We denote with A ⊆ E the set of wiretapped edges, where |A| ≤ z. The maximum number of wiretapped edges z is a known design parameter, but the set of wiretapped edges A is known only to Eve.
Every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is an erasure channel with parameters δ, δ E . The input alphabet of the channel is F L q ; we sometimes consider the channel input as a symbol over an extension field of F q , and sometimes as a vector of length L over F q (depending on the network coding scheme we use); in both cases we call each channel input a packet. The node v receives the packets that node u sends on the edge e with an erasure probability δ, while in case e ∈ A, Eve receives the packets sent over e with an erasure probability δ E , independently of node v. In particular, for a given channel e = (u, v), if X e denotes the channel input, Y e the reception of v, and Z e the (potential) reception of Eve, then,
Pr
Pr {Y e , Z e |X e } = Pr {Y e |X e } Pr {Z e |X e },
where ∅ is the symbol of erasure. To simplify notation, we will express entropy and rate in terms of packets. This enables us to omit the constant factor L log q, which is the size of one packet. We assume public channel state feedback. That is, after every packet transmission over the channel (u, v) , the receiving node v strictly causally acknowledges whether it received the packet correctly or an erasure happened, to all network nodes as well as to Eve. In the paper, we will use the notation F e,i to denote the state of the channel e = (u, v) during the i th transmission of node u (whether an erasure happens or not).
We also assume that there exist exactly h edge-disjoint paths between the source s and each receiver d ∈ D. As a result, the source can multicast to the destinations at rate h(1 − δ) [2] . This can be achieved by using a channel code on each edge, that transforms the edge to an error-free channel with capacity 1 − δ, and then a linear network code over the resulting errorfree network [2] , [3] . The source can also securely multicast to the destinations at rate (h − z)(1 − δ), again by first using a channel code to create an error-free network, and then using the secure network coding approach [4] .
As we discussed in the introduction, to securely send a message, our achievability schemes operate in two phases: they first create a common secret key K between the source s and the destinations in D; they then use this secret key to encrypt and send the message W . We think of the secret key K as a set of random packets that are known to the source and all destinations but not Eve. To describe our achievability schemes and outer bounds, we also use the following assumptions and notation; we summarize the notation used throughout the paper in Table I. • We use standard graph theory terminology; in particular, we denote the set of incoming and outgoing edges of v ∈ V by I v and O v ; we say that if nodes u and v are connected through an edge e = (u, v) then u and v are adjacent to each other and to e, and that u is a predecessor of v. • The source s has access to unlimited uniformly distributed randomness , but, for most of the paper (apart from the discussion in Section VIII-B), we will assume that no other network node has access to a private random source.
• The message W that the source sends has length N packets, i.e., W ∈ F L×N q . We will communicate this message by having each node transmit n times (so we will have n uses of each erasure channel).
• Given that we have a directed acyclic graph, we can impose a partial order on the vertices of the network and assume that each network node makes its i th transmission after all its predecessors make their i th transmission. 
We will also use the notation 
E is all the packets received over the edges in the set E after the first i transmissions. We apply the same notation for other vectors also. For instance, the source node transmits X i,s in its i th transmission, while Eve's observation after n transmissions is Z n A .
• The notation {u, v} denotes the set of all parallel edges starting from u and ending at v.
A. Security and Rate
The next two definitions formalize our notions of a secure coding scheme and secure capacity, for multicasting a message W securely from the eavesdropper, Eve.
Definition 1: A (n, , N) secure coding scheme uses every channel e ∈ E of the network n times to send N message packets, so that the destination fails to decode with probability smaller than and Eve learns less than information about the message packets. 1 In particular, the source and each network node u make their i th transmission on their adjacent edge e ∈ E using a deterministic encoding map φ i,e , such that:
After the completion of all transmissions, each destination d ∈ D uses a decoding map ψ d such that:
Eve knows the encoding and decoding maps, but she learns negligible information about W :
That is, in our schemes, to send the next packet, the source uses the message information, private randomness as well as past channel state feedback; the other network nodes do not use private randomness, but use the received packets from their incoming edges as well as past channel state feedback from their past transmissions. We emphasize that, although, in order to keep our definition general, we assume that the channel state feedback is public to all nodes, the specific schemes we propose in this paper have each node use the channel state feedback of its own transmissions; as a result, our schemes require only point-to-point ACK and NACK overhead. Our security (7) requirement complies with the usual definition of strong information-theoretic secrecy.
Definition 2: We say that a (n, , N) secure coding scheme has rate N n . We say that a secure communication rate R is 1 Note that the same term is used to bound both the error probability and the information leakage.
achievable over G if for any > 0 there exists a secure coding scheme with parameters (n, , N) such that
We call the highest achievable secure communication rate the secure capacity of the network. We next provide definitions that apply to the case of secure key generation (which, as we discussed, is one step of our achievability schemes). We emphasize that the exact value of the key is not important; what is important is that it is known by the source and the destinations but not by Eve.
Definition 3: A (n, ) secret-key generation scheme uses every channel e ∈ E of the network n times to create a common secret key K such that, each destination fails to create it with probability smaller than and Eve collects less than information about it. In particular, the source and each network node u make their i th transmission on their adjacent edge e ∈ E using a deterministic encoding map φ i,e , such that:
After the completion of all transmissions, each destination d ∈ D uses a map χ d to create the key K such that:
Eve knows the encoding and decoding maps, but she learns negligible information about K : 
We call the highest achievable secret key generation rate the secret-key capacity of the network.
III. BACKGROUND AND ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES
In this section we first review known secure message transfer over error-free networks, as well as secure message transfer over a single point-to-point erasure network with state feedback; we then develop two simple alternative schemes to our proposed scheme, that will serve as performance benchmarks.
A. Secure Network Coding Over Error-Free Networks
In the special case when δ = δ E = 0, i.e., we have errorfree channels, our setup reduces to secure network coding by Cai and Yeung [4] , [16] . We here briefly summarize the secure network coding approach.
This scheme uses parameters (1, 0, (h−z) + ) in our notation, i.e., it securely sends, for z < h, h − z message packets (and zero packets otherwise). The source produces z random packets . It inserts in the network linear combinations of the message and the random packets, and has intermediate nodes perform appropriate linear combinations so that, all receivers decode both types of packets, while Eve learns nothing about the message packets. In particular, let us assume that Eve simply discards any packet that is not innovative. 2 We denote z ≤ z the number of innovative packets Eve observes. Then, we can write Eve's observation in the following form:
Here [4] that the secure network coding scheme is optimal in terms of the achieved rate and that it uses the minimum amount of randomness that any optimal scheme might use. This work was followed up by a number of constructions for the coding operations that the source and the network nodes perform; in this paper we will use the constructions in [15] , which, as far as we know, are the only deterministic polynomial time constructions.
We can intuitively think of these results as follows. To offer perfect security against Eve who has access to at most z innovative packets, we need to send z packets of additional randomness and hence the secure capacity of the network is reduced by z as compared to its multicast capacity.
B. Secrecy Over a Point-to-Point Erasure Channel With Feedback
Consider the simplest possible network shown in Fig. 1 , consisting of a single channel with parameters δ, δ E , and z = 1. We next summarize the secure capacity achieving scheme for this channel that was proposed in [17] .
The scheme operates in two phases, a key generation phase and an encrypted message sending phase. In the first phase s and d agree on a shared key K that is secret from Eve, and in the second phase s uses this key to encrypt and send the message W that consists of N packets to d. The source s makes n 1 transmissions in the first phase and n 2 transmissions in the second phase.
When we next describe the two phases, we assume that, although we have a probabilistic channel, we receive exactly the number of packets that is expected on average; i.e., if s transmits n 1 packets d receives exactly (1 − δ)n 1 packets. Clearly, this is not true over a probabilistic channel; however, we can achieve exactly the same rates as the average value intuition predicts, by appropriately selecting the scheme parameters. For the complete technical argument, we refer the reader to [17] .
1) Key Generation Phase:
The source s transmits n 1 independent uniform random packets; d receives exactly (1 − δ)n 1 packets while Eve does not receive δ E (1 − δ)n 1 out of the packets that d receives. We can then create a key K of size δ E (1−δ)n 1 (i.e., equal to the number of packets that d receives and Eve does not) as follows. Let M ∈ F L×(1−δ)n 1 q denote the row vector of the (1 − δ)n 1 received packets; through the channel state feedback, d lets s know which packets are in M.
Let
be the parity check matrix of an MDS code. Then, both s and d can compute
As a consequence of the MDS property of H ,
For more details we refer the reader to [17] and [18] .
2) Encryption and Message Sending:
The main observation in [17] is that, we can use the constructed key K and a one-time pad approach to encrypt the message W , however, because Eve will observe only part of the source transmissions, we can use a shorter key than the message: we only need randomness equal to the amount of packets that Eve observes. Moreover, to minimize the amount of innovative packets that Eve receives, we reliably send the encrypted message packets using ARQ, i.e, packets are repeated until the destination node correctly receives. Accordingly, we select n 2 so that
(expressed in terms of packets) established between s and d, the encrypted message W E is calculated as follows:
where
is the generator matrix of an MDS code. The packets of the encrypted message W E are sent using ARQ. The probability that Eve receives such a packet is computed as follows. Eve receives a packet after the first transmission with probability (1 − δ E ). The probability that she receives the packet for the first time for after the kth repetition is
k is the probability that there is a kth repetition and she has not yet received the packet. Hence, Eve receives with probability
Thus, Eve receives n 2 (1 − δ)
different packets of W E , which exactly equals the size of the key we use.
The rate of the two-phase scheme as described here is calculated as follows:
In [17, Th. 1], this two-phase scheme is optimal. We recover this result as a special case of our more general construction and in particular as a special case of our Theorem 2.
C. Alternative Schemes
We here construct two simple alternative schemes to the scheme we propose in this paper.
1) Scheme 1 (Separation of Channel Coding and Secure Network Coding):
As we already discussed in the introduction, a straightforward approach is to first use point-to-point error correction to turn the erasure channels to logical error-free links of capacity 1 − δ. We can then apply secure network coding, to achieve overall a rate of (h − z) (1 − δ) . This approach does not exploit the erasures for secrecy.
2) Scheme 2 (Exploiting Eve's Erasures):
As observed by Wyner [13] and applied for networks in [19] (Chapter 5), if δ E > δ, even if we use error correction coding towards the legitimate destination, Eve still does not receive everything, which allows to achieve a secrecy rate of (δ E − δ) + over a point-to-point erasure channel. If we know which edges Eve wiretaps, over a network with z < h we can achieve a secrecy rate of (h − z)(1 − δ) + z(δ E − δ) + . This scheme, under the strong assumption that we know the location of Eve, exploits erasures but not feedback.
IV. MAIN RESULTS AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We develop a simple new achievability scheme that exploits erasures and feedback over networks, to achieve secrecy rates that are in some cases multiple times higher than the alternative Scheme 1. Our scheme operates in two phases, a key generation phase followed by an encrypted message sending phase. To build our scheme, we first develop a modified construction for the secure network coding scheme of Cai and Yeung [4] for error-free networks that also uses two phases; this scheme is described in Section V. Second, we design a general scheme for erasure networks with statefeedback. We distinguish between the rates we achieve towards a single receiver (unicast) and the rates we achieve towards a set of multiple receivers (multicast).
The first main result of the paper is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: In a network with erasures and public channel state feedback and with parameters h, t, z ≤ h, a secure communication rate
is achievable, where κ corresponds to the key rate that our key generation phase achieves and it equals
for a unicast problem, whereas it equals
for a multicast problem. Our coding scheme described in Section VI provides a constructive proof of Theorem 1 (together with some technical points that are delegated to the appendices).
Next, we derive two outer bounds which offer a performance comparison benchmark and provide proof of optimality in some cases. The first bound in Theorem 2 is valid for arbitrary networks, uses cut-set type arguments, and is a function of the parameters h and z. The second bound in Theorem 3 is only valid for networks where O s = I d = h and is a function of the parameter t in addition to the parameters h and z.
Theorem 2: For any achievable secure communication rate R over G and for z ≤ h it holds that
R ≤ (1 − δ) (h − z) + zδ E (1 − δ) 1 − δδ E 1 − δδ 2 E ,(22)whereas for z > h R ≤ hδ E (1 − δ) 1 − δδ E 1 − δδ 2 E .(23)
holds. Theorem 3: Assuming O s = I d = h, for any achievable secure communication rate R over G it holds that
We provide the proofs of Theorems 2-3 in Appendices C-D. As a corollary of Theorems 2-3 we have the following optimality result.
Corollary 1: Our scheme achieves secure capacity in the following cases: (20)- (21) is the secret-key capacity of the network.
In these cases, κ as defined by
Comparing the achieved rate (19) and the first outer bound given by Theorem 2 (22), we can show that the ratio between our achieved rate and the outer bound is not larger than 1 1−δ ; in most cases that we evaluated, the gap was in fact much smaller.
Corollary 2: For z ≤ h, the gap between the achieved secure communication rate of our scheme and the secure capacity of a network expressed as the ratio between the two is upper bounded by
An outline of the proofs of Corollaries 1-2 is provided in Section VII. 
A. Numerical Examples and Discussion

1) Special Cases That Reduce to Known Results:
hence in this special case the scheme achieves the same rate as the secure network coding scheme. Also, for h = z = = 1 we
, the optimal rate of a single channel network as seen in [17] .
2) Advantage Over the Alternative Scheme 1: For a multicast problem, the achieved rate of secure communication (19) can be written in a more intuitive form as follows:
The above formula makes explicit the advantage over Scheme 1 that achieves the secure communication rate (h − z) (1 − δ); note that when δ E ≤ δ, even Scheme 2 that takes into account Eve's erasures does not lead to better rates than Scheme 1 [19] (Chapter 5). The advantage of exploiting erasures and feedback is twofold. First, we achieve a higher key generation rate κ ≥ (h − z) (1 − δ). Second, we reduce the size of the key we need in the second phase from
. Next we illustrate quantitatively how large this advantage can be for an example network.
One can immediately see that the larger δ E and z are, the larger the advantage of exploiting erasures and feedback is. In particular, if z = h our scheme still achieves a nonzero rate, which is not possible without feedback (assuming δ E ≤ δ). In our example network we consider the case where δ = δ E . In this case, the highest achievable secure communication rate without feedback is (h − z) (1 − δ). We consider a network with parameters h = t = 10 and δ = 0.3. We plot in Fig. 2(a) the advantage of our scheme as the ratio between R and (h − z) (1 − δ). We see that our scheme achieves a rate up to 3 times higher than Schemes 1 and 2. With the increase of the network size or δ = δ E the advantage becomes even larger. Note that we have selected the parameter values for the example so that there is no difference between the unicast and the multicast rate that our scheme achieves.
3) Advantage Over the Alternative Scheme 2:
We here look at a case where Scheme 2 performs better than Scheme 1, and illustrate what benefits use of feedback (that our scheme includes) can offer on top of Scheme 2. Fig. 2(b) plots the ratio between R and (h − z) (1 − δ) + z(δ E − δ) + for parameters h = t = 10 and δ = 0.3, δ E = 0.5.
4) Gap Between the Achieved Rate and the Outer Bound:
Our achievable scheme is optimal only in some special cases; from Corollary 2 the gap between our achievability scheme and the first outer bound is at most 1 1−δ , but in our numerical evaluations we found that this gap can be much smaller. We here plot some representative results we got. In the cases where our achieved rate for unicast and for multicast differ, we plot the unicast rate.
Consider the bound given by Theorem 2. We express the gap between the outer bound and the achieved rate as the ratio between the two (i.e., 1 means no gap). We evaluate for values z ≤ h. We can observe that for h = z = t and with δ E → 0 the gap tends to 1 1−δ , which is the largest possible gap we might get. In other cases the gap can be much smaller, see Fig. 3 for a few examples.
For the cases where O s = I d = h holds, we can also compare with the minimum of our two outer bounds given by Theorems 2 and 3. Note that when z ≤ t, then (24) is not larger than (22); in this case, our scheme is optimal, i.e., we do not have any gap. Besides enabling us to prove this optimality result, the second bound in Theorem 3 offers an improvement over the first bound in Theorem 2 for some additional cases when z > t. In particular, if
holds, (24) is smaller than (22). As an example, on Fig. 4 we compare the gap that the bound of Theorem 2 gives and the gap we get when taking the minimum of the two bounds. We plot the gap for a few specific values and for z > t (for z ≤ t there is no gap in the second case). Both our scheme and our upper bounds are general in the sense that besides the min-cut value and the number of direct s-d edges, they do not depend on the topology of the network. A more sophisticated network specific design could result both in higher achieved rates and in improved upper bounds. However, such designs can involve large complexity, while for most parameter values that we tested, the rate of our simple and general scheme is already reasonably close to an upper bound.
V. TWO-PHASE SECURE NETWORK CODING SCHEME FOR ERROR-FREE NETWORKS In this section, we only examine error-free networks and simply make the point that the secure network coding scheme [4] -with a slight modification -can be cast as a two-phase scheme. We show that the modification does not affect the achieved rate, hence the two-phase secure network coding scheme is also optimal. That is, we provide a new, alternative scheme that achieves the secure capacity of an error-free network. We start by an illustrating example.
A. Example
For simplicity, in this example we assume unicast traffic. Consider the following simple network (Fig. 5) . Source s and destination d are connected through two parallel unit-capacity error-free channels out of which any one is being wiretapped by Eve (h = 2, z = 1). The secrecy capacity of the network is 1, hence s can send securely a unit size message W (i.e., a single packet, say w). Secure network coding has the source generate a random packet r . As shown in Fig. 5(a) , on one of the channels s sends r while on the other channel it sends r + w. Eve either sees r or r + w, in either case no information about w is leaked.
Assume now, that s and d already share a random key packet k, which is not known by Eve. Then, as shown in Fig. 5(b) , s can securely send two unit size messages w 1 and w 2 using k for encryption on both channels. Hence, in this case, a single shared key packet allows us to achieve the min-cut capacity of the network. Thus the question is, how can s and d set up a shared key. Since a secure network code offers a way to send any message w securely to d, this message may equally well be a key k. Consider the example in Fig. 6 , where in two transmissions two message packets are sent securely to d. In the first transmission a key is set up, while in the second transmission this key is used for encryption. Note that the achieved rate is 1, exactly the same as what the single phase secure network coding scheme achieves, that essentially simultaneously sets-up keys and transmits messages. Also note that the amount of additional randomness remains the same.
To avoid confusion, we note here that the randomness used in the secure network coding is often called a key. Indeed, this randomness is used to encrypt a message, however this randomness is not known by d at the moment of encryption. Further, this randomness does not necessarily remain secret from Eve. E.g. in our example in Fig. 5(a) , if Eve selects the top channel to wiretap, she learns r . To distinguish source randomness from keys we call a key a shared randomness between s and d, which is secret from Eve at the moment of encryption. We also have the property that the key remains secret from Eve given that the message is uniformly distributed.
B. Scheme Description
We use the same logic as in the motivating example to build a general scheme, that we will call in the following the twophase secure network coding scheme. Our scheme uses every channel n = n 1 +n 2 times, where n 1 and n 2 are the number of transmissions used for the two phases respectively. We use a specific secure network code construction as a building block. We select one such code at the outset; in each of the n transmissions, we use the same selected secure network code, but applied on different inputs. Hence, we have that Q i,e = Q j,e = Q e , ∀i, j .
We assume that our message has size N = n 2 h; to securely send it, we need a shared key K of size n 2 z between s and the destination nodes.
1. Key Generation: The sender generates a uniformly random key K of size n 2 z. It also generates additional randomness of size n 2 z 2 h−z . The key generation phase consists of n 1 = n 2 z h−z transmissions, in each slot s securely sends h − z packets from K . On edge e in the i th slot we send
where K (i ) is the i th h − z length fraction of K :
. Similarly, (i ) is the i th z length fraction of :
Encrypted Message Sending:
In the second phase, we use K for encryption, and operate the network at its min-cut h using the same secure network code n 2 times. We denote W (i ) the first h − z elements of the i th h length fraction of W and W (i ) the last z elements of the same fraction. K (i ) is the i th z length fraction of K . On edge e in the i th slot of the second phase we then send
It directly follows from the properties of the secure network coding scheme that all destination nodes know K and hence can decode W . Leveraging the security properties of the secure network code we use, we can show that our two-phase scheme is also secure; we delegate the proof to Appendix A. Achieved Rate: Our scheme conveys a message of size n 2 h using n 1 + n 2 transmissions, thus we achieve a rate equal to
which is the same as the rate of the secure network coding scheme. We further note that the amount of randomness we use is |K | + | | = n 2 hz h−z , which is also the same as the secure network coding scheme uses to securely send a message of size n 2 h. By selecting n 2 = h − z the rate h − z is exactly achieved after h transmissions.
VI. OUR PROPOSED ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME FOR ERASURE NETWORKS WITH FEEDBACK
We first describe our scheme for a single receiver node D = d, and then in Section VI-C we provide a slightly modified scheme that also applies for multicast. We will assume in this section that z ≤ h; we note that this assumption is not necessary to achieve nonzero rate over erasure networks, and we discuss the case where z > h in Section VIII. We next provide an example to illustrate the steps of our scheme, before we proceed with the general description.
A. Example
Consider the example network in Fig. 7 , that has three edges and two edge-disjoint paths between the source s and the destination d. Let z = 1. For simplicity, in this example when we calculate the number of received packets we work with expected values instead of random variables. Recall that the source s receives acknowledgments from both the intermediate node u and the destination d.
1) Key Generation:
The source s transmits n 1 independent random packets over each of its two outgoing channels. Both the destination node d and the intermediate node u receive n 1 (1 − δ) packets. Node u reliably transmits the random packets it has received to d using ARQ; to do so, node u also needs to make n 1 transmissions.
The achievable key rate corresponds to the number of packets that d receives but Eve does not. Eve has three possible choices to select which channel to wiretap, and when generating the key we need to consider her worst-case selection. 
packets that they both receive, and we get the same result as in the first case. We conclude that Eve's best choice (from her perspective) is the u-d channel. In this case, the destination d has
packets that Eve has not received, and thus a key rate of
is achievable using the key generation algorithm based on an MDS parity check matrix as described in Section III-B1. Recall that we do not need to know exactly which packets Eve receives, but only how many she receives: from the properties of MDS codes, it follows that the key that we produce is independent of the packets that Eve receives.
2) Encrypted Message Transmission: Let n 2 be the number of transmissions on each edge in the second phase. The message is encrypted in the form that we have already seen in (38): W E = W + K G, where K is the key and G is an MDS generator matrix. The encrypted message W E is split into two equal parts and each half is sent through one of the paths, using ARQ on each channel. We select the size of the key K to be equal to the number of packets Eve receives in the second phase. The MDS property of G ensures that Eve receives every packet with an independent linear combination of K , which means that Eve receives a set of one-time pad encrypted message packets.
Since the same forwarding strategy is applied on each channel, regardless of which channel Eve selects, she receives a certain packet with probability
Hence n 1 and n 2 are chosen such that |K | = n 2 (1 − δ)
B. Algorithm
As a first step we select h edge-disjoint paths between s and d. We ignore all other edges of G. The example in the previous section suggests that the achievable rate depends not only on h, z, δ and δ E , but also on the number of direct s-d channels. Let h = + t, where denotes the number of direct s-d channels and t denotes the number of multihop paths. Parameter ζ 1 that we define below corresponds to the expected number of packets that both d and Eve receive during the key generation phase. We have seen in the example that this number depends on the parameters t and . Similarly, parameter ζ 2 corresponds to the expected number of packets that Eve receives in the encrypted message sending phase.
1) Key Generation:
We define
We note that 3 4 is our particular choice as an exponent for the sublinear terms, any constant 0.5 < α < 1 could be used instead. The source s sends at most n 1 random packets on each of its h outgoing edges; it stops transmission on each channel as soon as n 1 (1 − δ) packets are acknowledged on the given channel. The intermediate nodes on each path forward the n 1 (1 − δ) packets that they receive to the next node on the path towards d using ARQ.
If d does not receive hn 1 (1 − δ) packets, then an error is
denote the vector of all the packets that d receives. Both s and d compute
is the parity check matrix of an MDS code.
2) Encryption and Message Sending: We select N, n 2 and n 2 such that
The encrypted message W E is computed as
where K is the key from the first phase and G ∈ F |K |×N q is the generator matrix of an MDS code.
We assign n 2 (1 − δ) packets to each of our paths. These packets are then forwarded on their assigned path to d using ARQ over each channel. If d does not receive all the packets of W E after n 2 transmissions, we declare an error.
C. Multicast
In this section we present our slightly modified scheme for the multicasting case, where there are more than one destination nodes and all of them have to receive the same message securely. We next highlight the modifications of the unicast scheme that are needed.
We first select h edge-disjoint paths towards each destination; we consider the union of these paths, and select a network code over the resulting configuration that would enable multicasting at the optimal rate from the source to the destinations. Again, we can ignore all edges that are not used by the network code.
In the key generation phase we need the following modification, to ensure that all d ∈ D receive the same set of packets and hence they all can compute the same key. Instead of sending new random packets on its outgoing edges, s selects in advance n 1 h(1 − δ) random packets that are sent reliably to all destination nodes using ARQ on each channel and applying the network code that we have chosen. Given this, we modify the parameter ζ 1 :
Note that this change implies a change of value for the parameters |K |, n 2 , n 2 , ζ 2 and N, however all formulas remain the same as defined for unicast. In the second phase, the only difference is that instead of forwarding through h edge-disjoint paths, we use the network code (together with ARQ) to reliably send the encrypted packets to all destinations.
Finally, we need to modify how we construct the matrices H and G. Note that in the unicast case the intermediate network nodes do not perform any coding, hence Eve will only receive packets that s produces. This property enables to code only at the source using any H and G matrices that have MDS property. In the case of multicasting, intermediate nodes may produce new linear combinations, hence Eve may receive combined packets as well, and we need these packets to not reveal any information to her. We can do so using secure network coding constructions. In particular, we will use here, instead of MDS codes, the MRD codes as proposed in [15] , that as far as we know are the most efficient deterministic constructions; yet other secure network code constructions are possible.
Assume that the network code operates over the field F q . We will here treat the packets as symbols in F q L and use a Gabidulin code [20] over F q L . We rely on the properties of MRD codes shown in [15] , and select the matrix
to be the parity-check matrix of a Gabidulin code over F q L .
In particular, let Q
denote a coefficient matrix that describes the different linear combinations of key generation packets that Eve might receive. We will see during the analysis that the probability that Eve receives a larger subset of packets is negligible. For the keys to be secure, we need that [H Q 
D. Analysis
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. We first prove that the key generation phase satisfies Definition 4, and a key rate
is achievable for unicast connections, while in the case of multicast a key rate
is achievable. Building on this property of the key generation phase, we then show that the encryption operation (see (38)) provides security of the message packets in the second phase. We delegate the complete proof to Appendix B.
E. Discussion
Our designs, by separating the key generation and the message sending phase, enable to individually optimize each phase, and accurately estimate upper bounds on the amount of information that Eve collects in each, which leads to simpler designs and expressions. Compared to error-free networks, we gain benefits in two ways: (1) we can create keys at higher rates during the first phase, and (2) we need to create a smaller amount of keys to protect the message-sending during the second phase, since Eve observes less relevant information over erasure networks.
Some key points in our constructions are:
• For both phases, we select ARQ for reliable transmission as opposed to any other form of forward error correction. ARQ is a capacity-achieving scheme for erasure channels, thus it is well suited to deliver reliably packets to the destinations, while at the same time, because Eve may receive repeated packets, it minimizes the amount of new information that Eve collects.
• To upper bound how much Eve learns, we consider the best (from her position) set of edges to wiretap.
• Our schemes require only point-to-point feedback,
i.e., ARQ as is implemented in most practical protocols today; thus the overhead of feedback is very small.
• We can leverage existing secure network code designs for our constructions; thus if in the literature more efficient constructions over error-free networks are developed, these can be translated to constructions for erasure networks with feedback using our approach.
• Our schemes reduce to the secure network coding constructions in the special case of error-free networks and to the optimal constructions in the special case of a single-edge network (see Section III). We also note that, although we have low feedback overhead and polynomial time code constructions, we need to operate with larger matrices than secure network coding, because we operate over probabilistic channels. Indeed, to ensure that we can reliably estimate an upper bound on the number of packets that Eve receives, we need to increase the number of transmissions we employ in each phase n 1 and n 2 accordingly, and as a result, also the size of the matrices H and G increase. How large these matrices need be, depends on the confidence we want to have. For instance, if we want our scheme to operate with an error probability smaller than (see Definitions 1 and 3), Proposition 1 in Appendix B shows that we need to select n 1 and n 2 to scale as O(log 2 1 ).
VII. OUTER BOUNDS
Theorems 2 and 3 provide outer bounds on the achievable secure communication rate. We here highlight some concepts and provide the proofs in Appendices C and D. When deriving our upper bounds we make the following assumptions which can only increase the achievable rates:
• The set of eavesdropped edges are known, we thus restrict Eve to one particular (best from Eve's perspective) selection of edges.
• The state of the eavesdropper's channel is also known to every node in the network. In the outer bound proof we will assume that F i contains also Eve's channel state.
• We assume a weaker security requirement. Instead of (7) we consider the condition
For the cases mentioned in Corollary 1, this immediately implies that weakening the security requirement to (43) does not increase the secure capacity.
Comparison of the Two Bounds
Theorem 2 holds over arbitrary networks, and develops a min-cut argument. We derive it by making two key steps. First, we apply a transformation that merges nodes of the network and prove that this transformation does not reduce the achievable rates. Second, we prove that on the resulting set of parallel edges, the parallel transmissions can be assumed to be independent without decreasing the transmission rates. This bound reduces to the bound of [17, Th. 1] in the special case where the network is a single channel.
The idea behind Theorem 3 is to additionally take into account that, over multihop paths we cannot support the same key generation rates as on single hop paths (which is not captured by min-cut arguments). This theorem applies for a restricted class of networks, where O s = I d = h. Intuitively, the restriction O s = I d = h ensures that the deletion of edges that are not on a path towards a destination node does not reduce the achievable secret-message rate. The main novelty of the proof is in Lemma 4, that shows that the amount of key generation packets that an intermediate node might send is limited by the amount of randomness it receives from the source. For the cases mentioned in Corollary 1, this in turn shows that in a multihop path the randomness cannot be used in any better way than forwarding it with ARQ. We build on this to prove that the achievable secure communication rate over a multihop path is lower than over a direct channel.
Comparing the two theorems, for z ≤ t, and under the assumptions of the theorem, Theorem 3 gives an optimality result and thus always dominates. For z > t, equation (26) determines which bound is tighter. Fig. 4 in Section IV shows an example numerical evaluation of the two bounds.
Proof Outline of Corollary 1
The corollary is a simple consequence of comparing (19) with (22) and (24). Clearly, if the the key generation phase was not optimal, then the two phases together could not be optimal either. It follows, that in the mentioned cases, κ is indeed the secret-key capacity of the network.
Proof Outline of Corollary 2
We compare the outer bound of Theorem 2 and the achieved rate of our scheme for a multicast problem. For the unicast problem the achieved rate can be only higher, hence the gap can be only smaller.
Inspecting the first and second order derivatives of the ratio between the achieved rate and the outer bound we can prove the following properties. The ratio is an increasing function of z, thus z = h gives the largest gap. Similarly, the gap increases with t, hence h = t gives the largest gap. In case h = z = t and δ is fixed, then the ratio takes its largest value when δ E → 0, in which case its value tends to 1 1−δ . We leave the details of the analysis as an exercise for the reader.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We collect here some observations that go beyond the modeling assumptions of our work, and may be interesting future research directions.
A. The Case of z > h
Over erasure networks, it is possible to support nonzero secrecy rates even when Eve wiretaps a larger number of edges than in the min-cut. What changes in this case is how much information Eve collects, as we next illustrate with a toy example.
Assume z = 2 and consider the two-hop line network shown in Fig. 8 . Against this stronger Eve, we can run our scheme as presented in Section VI, but with different parameters. We need to calculate how many packets Eve might receive in each phase. We give the calculation in expectation.
In the message sending phase Eve has two independent chances to overhear a certain packet, on each channel she receives a given packet with probability
, hence the number of different packets she receives (in expectation) is: In the key generation phase she gets n 1 (1 − δ)(1 − δ E ) packets in common with u on the first channel, while she receives a packet with probability 1−δ E 1−δδ E on the second channel, hence she is expected to get
packets in common with d, which allows a key rate
To calculate the achievable rate
we need to consider n 1 and n 2 such that
Note that for any given network and any given set of wiretapped edges a similar analysis is feasible. After investigating all the |E| z possible sets of wiretapped edges, we can design our code such that it provides secrecy against all possible eavesdropped sets. However, the worst-case selection of eavesdropped edges and thus the actual rates achieved highly depends on the topology of our network.
B. Use of Intermediate Randomness
Up to now, we have assumed that no intermediate node in the network can generate additional private randomness. Clearly, relaxing this assumption can only increase the achievable secure communication rate. However, the problem of finding the secure capacity of a network becomes significantly harder, and it is open even for error-free networks. The difficulty lies in finding the optimal way of generating and canceling out keys inside the network. Consider the example, known in the network coding community, depicted in Fig. 9 . In this example we have an error-free network, where h = z = 1. Without intermediate randomness the secure capacity is h − z = 0. However, if node u can generate randomness, it can provide to the source and the destination common randomness that can be used as a key and a secure communication rate 1 is achieved, as shown in the figure.
The problem simplifies in case G is a minimal network, i.e., a directed acyclic network where removing any edge would reduce its multicast capacity. In such a network, any cut-set contains only forward edges and the outer bound given by Theorem 2 holds even for the case when intermediate nodes can generate private randomness.
A simple strategy to use the intermediate node private randomness, is to have over every edge e = (u, v), u create a private key K uv with node v, using the optimal point-to-point strategy in [17] ; we then simply transmit the message from s to d hop-by-hop, with every intermediate node decrypting its received message and re-encrypting it with the next hop key (we will call this Scheme 3). Given that the keys used on each hop are independent from each other, and that we do not know which are the edges that Eve wiretap, we need to assume, when creating the key for each edge, that Eve may be wiretapping this exact edge, and create an amount of key equal to the amount of packets that Eve collects through this edge. As a result, this strategy would protect the message even if Eve was wiretapping all edges in the network. Thus Scheme 3 exploits the private intermediate node randomness, but does not exploit the limited network presence of Eve, the fact that Eve will not wiretap all edges.
Scheme 3 results in a secure communication rate
; for z ≥ h, Scheme 3 is optimal, as it matches the outer bound given by Theorem 2.
Corollary 3: For a minimal network G, where z ≥ h and where network nodes have access to unlimited private randomness, the secure capacity of the network is
and it is achieved by a scheme that sends message packets securely hop-by-hop along h paths using on each edge the secure scheme of [17] . Interestingly, for z < h, over minimal networks, our proposed scheme that does not use any intermediate randomness, outperforms the use of hop-by-hop keys created through private randomness.
C. Additional Edges Can Help
Our coding scheme assumes that we first select h edge disjoint paths from the source s towards each receiver d, and then operate our scheme using only the edges in the selected paths. This is a standard first step in deterministic network code designs for multicasting without security considerations, and it enables us to leverage these designs for our constructions. However, when we are interested in secrecy, using only the edges that are designated to carry messages, although in some cases makes no difference (e.g., see Corollary 1 for cases where our schemes are optimal), in other cases it can be suboptimal.
One such example network is depicted in Fig. 10 . There are two edges connecting the source s and the intermediate node u and one edge connecting node u and the destination node d. Let z = 1 and assume that δ < 0.5. In this case, the following strategy can be applied. On one of the edges, the source s sends independent random packets to node u. These packets can act as a private random packet source for u. Given this, we can run Scheme 3 on the path that connects s and u through the second (s, u) edge, and the (u, d) edge. That is, s encrypts and sends the message to u using the scheme in [17] ; u decrypts it, re-encrypts and sends it to d using the same scheme. The assumption that δ < 0.5 ensures that u has access to sufficient amount of randomness to create the (u, d) key. As a result, the same secure communication rate is achieved as if s and d had a direct channel between them.
As the example suggests, the potential benefit of using additional edges comes from the key generation phase, where the not used edges could carry additional randomness.
D. Unicast Rate
Note that the scheme for multicast (see Section VI-C) results in a lower secure multicast rate than the minimum of the secure (unicast) communication rates to the individual destinations achieved by the scheme in the preceding section. There is such a gap in the case where z > t, where t is the number of multihop paths between s and the destination with the lowest secure unicast capacity.
The example on Fig. 11 with z = 2 help to explain why this gap shows up. If we had a unicast problem, with d 1 as the only destination, then we could achieve a key rate 
Clearly, there exist methods to improve on this; for instance, once we learn which random packets d 1 and d 2 have received differently, we can reconcile the two sets through coded transmissions by the source. Whether there is a fundamental gap between achievable unicast and multicast rates for z > t remains open.
APPENDIX A SECURITY OF TWO-PHASE SECURE NETWORK CODING
In the first phase we use new independent randomness in each slot, hence we know from the secure network code that
In the second phase we use only randomness of which Eve has no information, hence her observation of the first phase does not help her collect information on W . With a slight abuse of our notation we denote Eve's observation in the second phase by Z n 2
A . Formally,
where we used (51) and that Z n 2
A is a function of (K , W ). Further, in each slot we use independent randomness, thus
Hence, we can focus on one transmission of the second phase. Again we can assume that Eve discards any packet that is not innovative. Let z ≤ z be the number of innovative packets she receives. We can write Eve's observation in the i th transmission of the second phase as
for some matrix Φ i,A . From the properties of the secure network code and K we see that K (i )Q A is a set of uniform random packets and W Φ i,A is at most z linear combinations of packets from W . Hence, as we noted in the case of secure network coding, from Eve's perspective this is a one-time pad encrypted data. From this observation
follows, hence our scheme is secure.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Key Generation Phase
We introduce some notation. We denote the size of the generated keys k 1 ,
We denote M the set of packets d receives, M Z is the subset of these that Eve receives and M d is the subset that only d receives. The corresponding rows of matrix H are H Z and H d . Hence K can be written as
Note that in case the key generation is successful, then |M| is
are not deterministic, they depend on the channel realizations F n 1 .
We have
since H d is full-rank and
The probability that Eve receives more than |M| − k 1 packets can be bounded as follows:
for some constant c 1 > 0. We used that ζ 1 ≥ E |M Z | irrespective of Eve's selection of edges. The last inequality follows from the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound (see [21] ). We see from (82) and (79) 
A F n 1 ; K ) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a large enough n 1 . This proves the security of the key. The bound we get decays to zero even if the exponent The key generation fails if d does not receive hn 1 (1 − δ) packets. We calculate the probability of the event that a node who has received n 1 (1 − δ) packet fails to forward all of these to the next node towards d. This event happens if out of n 1 transmissions more than n 1 − n 1 (1 − δ) erasures occur. Let η denote the number of erasures of n 1 transmissions. Then, the probability of the event equals
where c 2 > 0 is some constant. In the last step we used the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. This shows that the probability of successful forwarding of n 1 (1 − δ) packets can be made arbitrarily close to 1 on each channel, hence the probability that d receives hn 1 (1 − δ) packets is also arbitrarily close to 1 by selecting a large enough n 1 . The claimed key generation rate lim n 1 →∞ |K | n 1 = κ directly follows from the parameter values and from the fact that lim n 1 →∞
B. Encrypted Message Sending Phase
Destination d can decode the message if he receives all packets in the second phase. The probability of error has the same nature as in the first phase and thus can be made arbitrarily small by selecting a large enough n 2 .
Similarly as in the two-phase secure network coding scheme, we observe that the first phase does not help Eve to learn about W . Formally, if I (Z
where Z n 2
A denotes the packets that Eve receives in the second phase. A can be written as W Z E , which denotes the subset of encrypted packets Eve receives. Let G Z denote the corresponding rows of G, then
In case |W Z E | ≤ |K |, then K G Z is a set of uniformly distributed independent packets, thus W Z E is a set of one-time-pad encrypted message packets, hence
where c 3 > 0 is a constant. We omit the details of the last step, where we bound the probability of the event that Eve receives significantly more packets than she is expected to. We use the same technique as we have seen in (82). This together with (87) shows that for a sufficiently large n = n 1 + n 2 the scheme satisfies (7). The low error probability of the second phase follows from a similar argument that we have seen for the key generation phase (see (86)). The rate assertion follows directly from the parameter definitions and from the rate of the key generation phase. 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove here (22). To obtain (23) for z > h, we substitute z = h to (22). The resulting outer bound is valid, because the secure capacity cannot decrease by decreasing z.
Given a network G consider the partitioning of the vertices (V 1 , V 2 ) such that s ∈ V 1 , d ∈ V 2 and it has the minimum cut value h. We create a new network G (V , E ) by merging all the nodes in V 1 with s and all the nodes in V 2 with d. We further remove all (d, s) edges. The resulting graph is depicted in Fig. 12 . We assume that Eve wiretaps a known subset of size z of the remaining edges. Note that restricting the eavesdropper to a particular subset of channels can only increase the secure capacity of the network. The removal of (d, s) edges does not affect the achievable rates, since no nodes in V 2 can generate randomness, and hence whatever a scheme would send through the (d, s) edges, s can also generate from its randomness and from the public acknowledgments. 3 Note that the channel states are known to Eve, thus the channel itself cannot be used to generate secure randomness. As a consequence, the secure capacity over G cannot be smaller than over G. We give an upper bound on the secure capacity over G which is also a valid upper bound for G.
Without loss of generality we assume that packets sent in parallel on different edges are always all independent. If any scheme does not satisfy this assumption, we can construct another scheme that achieves the same rate and satisfies the assumption as follows. We take h independent copies of the scheme (using independent messages and new independent additional randomness). In every h transmissions we proceed one transmission of each copy such that on all the h edges a different copy of the scheme runs in each transmission. Clearly the rate does not change and also packets sent in parallel are independent.
Notation: Consistently with our previously introduced notation we use
where Y i,A denotes the i th reception of d through the set of eavesdropped channels and Y i,E \ A the reception over the not eavesdropped channels. We use X i,s = (X i,A , X i,E \ A ) in the same fashion. Recall that for the outer bound we assume that A is known.
We start from the following inequality:
Through a series of inequalities we prove the following two lemmas that provide bounds for the latter two terms in (97). Lemma 1:
. 3 The assumption that intermediate nodes do not generate randomness is exploited only at this point of the proof. For a minimal network, there are no (d, s) edges to remove, hence if G is a minimal network, the outer bound holds even if nodes can generate private randomness.
Applying these results in (97) and rearranging terms provide the claimed upper bound on R.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We know that d can decode with an error probability at most . Thus, from Fano's inequality:
where we used that channel erasures are independent of the message and of each other and that packets sent in parallel are independent of each other.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: We show the following two inequalities:
We combine these two and get that
We observe that
and thus we can merge the entropy terms corresponding to A and E \ A without violating the inequality (we use again the independence property of parallel transmissions). We conclude that
What remains is to show (103) and (104). Consider first (103). We use again Fano's inequality:
where we used the independence property of the channel erasures as well as independence of packets sent in parallel over different channels. We derive (104) as follows. In the last step we used that 
and that from (43)
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3 We proceed similarly as we did in the proof of Theorem 2. From a network G we construct a new graph G such that the secure capacity over G cannot be smaller than over G. First, we delete all nodes u for which (d, u) ∈ E. Note that this step cannot decrease the secure capacity of network, because if (d, u) ∈ E, then there is no path between u and d, otherwise G would have a cycle. After this step d has only incoming edges. Next, we merge all intermediate nodes u / ∈ {s, d} into one node. As a result, G is a network with three nodes: s, d and u which represents all other nodes. By this we could only increase the achievable rates, hence the upper bound we derive is valid for G. Note that G might be cyclic, there might be some edges (u, s). We know that (d, u) / ∈ E , since d does not have any outgoing edges. As a next step we delete all edges (u, s) from E . This step cannot reduce the secure capacity of the network, because s knows exactly every packet that u has, hence it can produce any packet that u might send on the (u, s) channel. We derive our bound for z = min{t, z}. In case z > t using z instead of z restricts Eve, hence cannot decrease the secure capacity. We consider an eavesdropper who wiretaps on a known subset of size z of the u-d channels. Note that this restriction can only increase the secure capacity of the transformed network. Our resulting graph G looks as depicted in Fig. 13 .
For the same reasons as seen in Theorem 2 we might assume that parallel transmissions over different channels are independent.
We have 
We give bounds on the last two terms seen in (139). 
where E 5 = N + n + h 2 ( ) + n (1−δδ E ) 1−δ E . We give the proof of Lemmas 3-4 in the following subsections. The proof of Lemma 5 is a verbatim copy of the proof of Lemma 2 with {s, d} ∪ {u, d} \ A placed in the role of E \ A. For this reason, we omit the proof.
We apply the results of Lemmas 3-5 in (139) and get the claim of the theorem after rearranging terms.
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: We observe that Y n A is a function of (Y n u , F n ), and hence The proof of Lemma 1 holds verbatim here, from which we know that
From these two inequalities the claim of the lemma follows.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: We introduce the notation P = {s, d} ∪ {u, d} \ A, i.e., P denotes the set of not eavesdropped incoming edges of d. We use the fact that Y n A is a function of (Y n u , F n ). From this we have
We expand these terms as follows: 
In (a) we used that Z n,A is a function of (Y n−1 u , F n ) and F n is independent of every other variable. In To get the statement of our lemma we combine (146), (164) and (171) 
